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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THF. STATE OF UTA~ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18255 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, was charged 
with producing a controlled substance, a third-degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-S(l)(a)(i) (1953), as 
amended, and with possession of a controlled substance, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953), as amended, and was tried before a 
jury in the Fifth Judicial District Court for Beaver County, 
the Honorable Robert F. Owens presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury found appellant guilty of both counts, and 
the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment in the Utah 
State Prison for a period not to exceed five years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the appellant's 
conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 7, 1980, responding to informant 
information, Milford City Police Chief Richard Hannah and 
Deputy Sheriff Dennis Cox drove to a residence adjacent to 
appellant's home (Motion to Suppress Transcript 76, 77 
hereinafter denoted ST). Receiving permission to enter the 
adjacent property, the officers discovered marijuana growing 
on appellant's property near a three-foot retaining wall {ST 
77, 81, 103). 
Sheriff Cox then reached over the retaining wall and 
plucked three leaves from a nearby marijuana plant {ST 81). 
Based upon his observations, Chief Hannah executed a 
search warrant affidavit whereupon Justice of the Peace H. C. 
Cook issued a search warrant {ST 81, 90). 
At ~:50 p.m. on the same day, Chief Hannah and 
Officer Cox, along with other police officers, returned to 
appellant's property to conduct a search pursuant to the 
warrant {ST 83). Finding no one at home, the officers 
searched the surrounding property and found six marijuana 
plants hidden from view by a colored plastic sheet 
approximately twenty-four feet from the southwest corner of 
appellant's easterly facing home {ST 84). Two other plants 
were found about twenty-six feet from the southeast corner of 
the home {ST 85). In a root cellar located behind appellant's 
-2-
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home, the officers found 110 marijuana plants hidden from view 
by a false well covered on top by window panes (ST 86). All 
marijuana plants seized by the officers were placed in black 
plastic bags and transported to the Milford City Police 
Department (ST 87, 88). 
When appellant returned home later that evening, 
Chief Hannah served him the search warrant (ST 125). In the 
search of appellant's home, the investigating officers found 
marijuana stems, marijuana seeds, and ash residue from burned 
marijuana (Trial transcript 103, 131 hereinafter denoted TT). 
On the basis of this physical evidence, Sheriff Cox arrested 
appellant (TT 147). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MARIJUANA TAKEN FROM APPELLANT'S 
RESIDENCE AND PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
A. EVIDENCE DISCOVERED UNDER THE SEARCH 
WARRANT IS NOT FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE. 
During the evidence suppression hearing, appellant 
argued that the search warrant was based upon illegally seized 
evidence--the three plucked marijuana leaves--and thus 
derivative evidence seized under the search warrant was "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" and therefore inadmissible. The trial 
-3-
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court excluded as evidence the three marijuana leaves, but 
ruled, however, that the marijuana plants captured under the 
search warrant were admissible. 
On his appeal before this Court, appellant argues 
that the marijuana plants seized under the search warrant 
should have been excluded as evidence and the lower court's 
failure to so rule constitutes reversible error. The relevant 
case law, however, belies appellant's claim and illuminates 
his misconstruction of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine. 
The exclusionary rule of evidence was first 
enunciated in Weeks v. United States, 232 u.s. 383 (1914), 
wherein the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by an 
unlawful search and seizure was not admissible against an 
accused in a federal court. Later, the exclusionary rule was 
held applicable to criminal prosecutions in state courts. 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which 
merely extended the Weeks exclusionary rule to derivative 
evidence, was first articulated in Nardone v. United States, 
308 U.S. 338 (1939). Citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the precursor of the poisonous 
tree doctrine, the Nardone Court stated: 
-4-
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To forbid the direct use of metho<ls thus 
characterized but to put no curb on their 
full indirect use would only invite the 
very methods deemed "inconsistent with 
ethical standards and destructive of 
personal liberty." What was said in a 
different context in Silverthorne Lumber 
Co. [251 U.S. at 392] ••• is oertinent 
here: "The essence of a provision 
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in 
a certain way is that not merely evidence 
so acquired shall not be used before the 
court, but that it shall not he used at 
all." 
308 U.S. at 340, 341. 
A standard for determining whether proffered 
evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree was articulated in 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487, 488 (1963), 
quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959): 
We need not hold that all evidence is 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" simply 
because it would not have come to light 
but for the illegal actions of the police. 
Rather, the more apt question in such a 
case is "whether, granting establishment 
of the primary illegality, the evidence to 
which instant objection is made has been 
come at by exploitation of that illegality 
or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint." 
Thus, the efficacy of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine 
to any given case depends on whether there exists a sufficient 
connection between the initial illegal search or seizure and 
derivative evidence obtained therefrom. 
-5-
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One type of insufficient connection between fruit 
and tree occurs if derivative evidence has a source 
independent of the prior, illegally seized objects. 
Silverthorne Lumber Co., supra, 251 U.S. at 392. This 
exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is 
explained further in People v. Eastman, 61 Cal. App. 3d 662, 
132 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1976). There, defendant was convicted of 
selling heroin on the strength of the assistance and 
information provided by two drug users. The two users offered 
their assistance to the police in exchange for a promise that 
they would not be arrested for heroin possession. The police 
had discovered the heroin pursuant to an illegal search of the 
user's home. Following his conviction, the defendant appealed 
arguing that the heroin evidence upon which his conviction was 
based should have been suppressed because it was fruit of the 
poisonous tree. Construing the poisonous tree doctrine 
articulated in Wong Sun, supra, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal stated: 
[T]here must be ••• a connection between 
the impropriety and the subsequent 
transaction so that it can be said, 
fairly, that the two transactions cannot 
be treated separately. In short, evidence 
is not rendered inadmissible against a 
defendant merely because there is a 
relationship between the evidence and some 
prior illegal police activity, if, for 
example, the evidence was obtained by the 
police as the result of an independent 
intervening act. • • • 
-6-
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132 Cal. Rptr. at 514. Applying this construction, the court 
of appeal affirmed defendant's conviction holding that the 
seizure of heroin which afforded the basis for his conviction 
was sufficiently separate from the unlawful search of the 
user's home, and thus the "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine did not apply. 
In the instant case, the poisonous tree doctrine is 
similarly inapplicable. As Officers Hannah and Cox stood by 
the retaining wall, two separate, distinct and independent 
events occurred: first, both officers observed in open view 
marijuana plants growing in appellant's property; and second, 
following this observation, Sheriff Cox picked three leaves 
from a nearby marijuana plant. Based solely upon this 
observation before the three leaves were picked, the officers 
concluded that the plants growing on appellant's property were 
marijuana (ST 77, 134). That this conclusion was both 
accurate ano reasonable is not for a moment in doubt. Both 
officers had had extensive training and much practical 
experience in the identification of marijuana plants (ST 81; 
TT 135). Furthermore, the plants actually observed by the 
officers were fully mature and located only three feet from 
the retaining wall, and thus were easily identifiable (TT 135, 
136). 
More importantly, the search warrant affidavit was 
founded solely upon the open view observation of marijuana 
-7-
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growing in appellant's property, and it was not based, in 
whole or in part, upon the subsequent seizure of the three 
marijuana leaves (Trial Record, p. 95). Thus, the search 
warrant itself was independent of the seizure of the three 
marijuana leaves; and as a corollary, all marijuana plants 
seized under the search warrant were independent also. 
Therefore, invoking Nardone and Wong Sun, supra, the marijuana 
plants seized under the search warrant were not fruit of the 
poisonous tree. 
Appellant cites United States v. Paroutian, 299 F~2d 
486 {2d Cir. 1962), as authority for his claim that the seized 
marijuana plants represented fruit of the poisonous tree. 
Paroutian, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. 
There, in a warrantless search of defendant's apartment, 
police officers uncovered heroin hydrochloride and a letter, 
both of which were hidden in a secret compartment in a closet. 
The heroin and the letter constituted the core of the 
government's case. Following his conviction, the defendant 
appealed, contending, inter alia, that the lower court erred 
when it failed to suppress critical evidence unearthed in the 
unlawful search. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
defendant's conviction holding that evidence seized under the 
unlawful search represented fruit of the poisonous tree. 
-8-
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The court of appeals did recognize, however, the independent 
source exception to the poisonous tree doctrine: 
The unlawful search taints all 
evidence obtained at the search or through 
leads uncovered by the search. This rule, 
however, extends only to facts which were 
actually discovered by a process initiated 
by the unlawful act. If information which 
could have emerged from an unlawful search 
in fact stems from an independent source, 
the evidence is admissihle. 
Id. at 489 (emphasis added). 
In Paroutian, damning evidence was actually 
discovered by a process initiated by an unlawful act (the 
illegal search); thus the evidence was fruit of the poisonous 
tree and should have been suppressed. In the case at bar, 
however, the search warrant under which the marijuana plants 
were seized was based solely upon informant information and an 
open view observation--acts that were completely independent 
of Sheriff Cox's seizure of the three marijuana leaves. 
Therefore, the plants seized under the search warrant were not 
tainted by the earlier seizure of the marijuana leaves. 
Hence, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to 
suppress evidence obtained under the search warrant. 
B. THE POLICE OFFICERS' OPEN VIEW 
OBSERVATION OF MARIJUANA LOCATED ON 
APPELLANT'S PROPERTY IS NOT A FOURTH 
AMENDMENT SEARCH. 
Next, appellant argues that the officers' open view 
observation of marijuana growing on his property constitutes 
-9-
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an unreasonable search violating the Fourth Amendment. In 
addition, he contends that the plain view doctrine cannot 
extricate this alleged unlawful search because the officers' 
observation of the marijuana was not inadvertent, citing 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
Reliance upon the plain view doctrine and Coolidge, 
however, indicates appellant's confusion over basic Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure doctrine as applied to the 
instant case. The plain view doctrine, as construea in 
Coolidge, supra, applies when: 
•.• the police officer • • • [has] a 
prior justification for an intrusion in 
the course of which he came inadvertently 
across a piece of evidence incriminating 
the accusea. The doctrine serves to 
supplement the prior justification--
whether it be a warrant for another 
object, hot pursuit, search incident to 
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate 
reason for being present unconnected with 
a search directed against the accused--and 
permits the warrantless seizure. 
403 U.S. at 466. Thus, the plain view doctrine articulates 
circumstances in which evidence may be seized without a 
warrant. 
In the instant case, however, appellant's attack, 
based upon Coolidge, is directed not at a seizure of evidence, 
but at the police officers' observation of marijuana located 
on appellant's property. Thus, appellant employs the wrong 
-10-
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case and wrong principle in constructing his Fourth Amendment 
attack upon the officers' initial observation. Furthermore, 
plain view analysis presupposes a prior valid intrusion; i.e., 
hot pursuit, valid arrest, or a warrant authorizing a search 
for objects other than those actually seized. In the instant 
case, however, there was no prior intrusion by the police 
officers; thus, the Coolidge doctrine is not applicable. 
While appellant's use of plain view is inappropriate 
here, the open view doctrine associated with Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), is helpful in resolving his claim 
that the officers' observation of marijuana represents an 
unreasonable search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. In 
Katz, the Supreme Court rejected any lingering notions that 
search and seizure analysis was grounded in trespass doctrine 
that presupposed a physical intrusion into constitutionally 
protected areas: 
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places. What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks 
to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected. 
Id. at 351, 352 [citations omitted]. The Katz standard 
entails a two-part test: 
-11-
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first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as 
"reasonable." 
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, if a police 
officer's observations broach a defendant's reasonable 
expectations of privacy, a search in the Fourth Amendment 
sense has occurred, and further Fourth Amendment analysis then 
addresses the reasonableness of that search. State v. Lee, 
Utah, 633 P.2d 48, 54 (1981) (Maughan, c. J., dissenting). 
See also: State v. Kaaheena, 575 P.2d 462, 466 (Hawaii 
1978). 
The facts of the instant case clearly reveal that 
appellant did not harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy 
concerning the marijuana growing on his property. Appellant 
grew marijuana openly without protective covering within arm's 
length of his neighbor's property. Furthermore, the 
investigating officers openly observed the marijuana without 
any precedent efforts to uncover or reveal the plants, nor did 
their observation require an intrusion upon appellant's 
property. Given such a bold enterprise conducted in broad 
daylight next to a neighbor's property where appellant must 
have known his efforts would be observed by others, there is 
simply no support for the proposition that appellant even 
harbored a subjective expectation of privacy, and it would 
-12-
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require an even greater leap of faith to conclude that society 
would deem such an expectation reasonable. Because 
appellant's brazen activities are not worthy of Katz 
protection, the investigating officers' open view observation 
did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 
In addition, this Court's analysis in State v. Lee, 
supra, further buttresses respondent's claim that a search <lid 
not occur. In Lee, the defendant was suspected of 
burglarizing a mobile home sales park. As the investigating 
officer walked to the front door of defendant's home, he 
noticed heavy equipment in a truck camper parked in the 
driveway. Shining a light through the camper window, the 
officer noticed an arc welder and several tool boxes that had 
been stolen earlier that evening. 
Following his conviction, the defendant appealed 
contending, inter alia, that the discovery of stolen equipment 
in his truck constituted an unconstitutional search. 
Rejecting this claim and affirming his conviction, this Court 
held: 
Thus, an officer is not expected to 
ignore what is exposed to observation from 
a position where he is lawfully entitled 
to be. • • • That does not constitute a 
"search" within the meaning of the 
constitutional provisions. 
633 P.2d at 51. See also: State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 
632 P.2d 44 (1981). 
-13-
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Similarly, in the instant case, Officer Cox and 
Chief Hannah could not be expected to ignore marijuana plainly 
and openly exposed to observation, and viewed from a position 
where the officers were lawfully entitled to be. Thus, their 
observation does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 
Therefore, the trial court correctly denied appellant's motion 
to suppress evidence seized under the warrant. 
POINT II 
THE REQUESTING OFFICER'S FAILURE TO SIGN 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT 
NULLIFY THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
Following the observation of appellant's property 
which revealed marijuana growing thereon, Chief Hannah 
executed an affidavit upon which a search warrant was issued. 
Altogether four or five warrant affidavits were executed by 
Chief Hannah, but the one returned to the magistrate following 
the search was not signed at the bottom, although it was 
signed by him at the top following the words "The peace 
officer undersigned, being sworn, states on oath" (Trial 
Record, ST 120). The other warrants not returned to the 
magistrate were signed by Chief Hannah at the top and bottom 
of the affidavit (Trial Record, ST 119-121). Appellant 
contends that Chief Hannah's failure to sign the returned 
affidavit in the space immediately above the executing 
magistrate nullified the search warrant. 
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In evaluating appellant's claim it is wise to 
consider the Supreme Court's admonition against highly 
technical objections to the completeness of a search warrant 
and the affidavit in support thereof: 
If the teachings of the Court's cases are 
to be followed and the constitutional 
policy served, affidavits for search 
warrants, such as the one involved here, 
must be tested and interpreted by 
magistrates and courts in a common sense 
and realistic fashion. They are normally 
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and 
haste of a criminal investigation. 
Technical requirements of elaborate 
specificity once enacted under common law 
pleadings have no proper place in this 
area. 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). Here, 
this Court is faced with such an objection. It is clear from 
his testimony that Chief Hannah thought that he was properly 
executing the affinavit hy signing at the top (ST 118, 119). 
Furthermore, Chief Hannah did attach his signature, albeit at 
the top, swearing an oath that the statements that followed 
were true. In addition, at least one of the search warrant 
affidavits not returned to the magistrate was signed at both 
the top and the bottom. 
In People v. Gloss, 109 Cal. Rptr. 583, 34 Cal. App. 
3d 74 (1973). Appellant was charged with and convicted of 
both the possession and sale of marijuana. On appeal, 
appellant argued that the search warrant was defective 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
because a two-page statement of facts attached to the 
supporting form affidavit had not been signed by the affiant. 
Citing Ventresca, supra, the court of appeal rejected 
appellant's claim and held that "[s]uch an extremely technical 
and formalistic argument is inappropriate •••• " and that 
"the two-page attachment was obviously incorporated into the 
affidavit." 109 Cal. Rptr. 58 7, 58 8. 
Here, as there, appellant's formalistic argument is 
equally inappropriate, and certainly Chief Hannah affixed his 
signature with due regard to the requirements of his oath in 
stating facts and circumstances known to be true. Hence, the 
affidavit was not defective, and the warrant was not 
nullified. 
POINT III 
THE RESPONDENT LAID SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION 
AT TRIAL FOR ADMISSION OF THE SEIZED 
MARIJUANA AS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. 
The search of appellant's home and surrounding 
property produced marijuana plants, stems and ash residue that 
were placed in three plastic hags marked Trial Exhibits One, 
Two and Three. Following the search on October 7, 1980, the 
three bags were transported to the Milford City Police Depart-
ment (TT 107). While at the station, Chief Hannah opened 
Exhibit Three and removed a sample for testing, whereupon he 
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resealed the exhibit ana then turned all three bags over to 
Officer Clarence Hutchison, the property officer for the 
Beaver County Sheriff's Department (TT 108, 198, 199). 
Officer Hutchison then transportea the three sealed plastic 
bags to the Beaver County Jail where he locked them in the 
property room (TT 199). There the bags remained until they 
were summoned by the trial court (TT 199). 
On November 16, 1980, Officer Hutchison entered the 
property room and removed a sample from Exhibit Three which he 
placed in a box that was later mailed to the Utah State Health 
Laboratory for analysis (TT 200). The sample removed by Chief 
Hannah from Exhibit Three on October 7, 1980, was taken by him 
to the State Health Laboratory in Salt Lake City, and turned 
over to Mr. Bruce B. Beck, a toxicologist (TT 110, 177). Mr. 
Beck also received a sample from Officer Cox on October 10, 
1980 (TT 179). 
The samples received from Officers Cox and Hutchison 
were positively identified by Mr. Beck as marijuana, while the 
test results for Chief Hannah's sample were negative (TT 183, 
184, 188). 
On the first day of appellant's trial, November 9, 
1981, respondent proffered as physical evidence Exhibits One, 
Two, and Three, the three plastic bags of marijuana (TT 202). 
Also proffered was a letter marked Exhibit Four that allegedly 
accompanied a sample sent to the State Health Lab {TT 202). 
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Appellant's objections to the admission of each of the four 
exhibits were sustained by the trial court (TT 202, 203, 206, 
207). 
In an effort to provide additional· foundation for 
Exhibit Four, Gary Cartwright, the Beaver County Sheriff, was 
called to testify (TT 208). Following his testimony, 
respondent again proffered Exhibit Four which was received in 
evidence over appellant's objection (TT 211). 
At 6:40 p.m. on the first day of trial, respondent 
moved the trial court for a continuance (TT 222). The court 
granted the motion over appellant's objection and continued· 
the trial until Thursday, November 12, 1981 (TT 223). The 
court granted the motion to continue for two reasons: The 
lateness of the hour and the court's unanticipated rulings on 
the evidence (TT 224). 
On November 10, 1981, pursuant to a court order, the 
court clerk removed the three bags of marijuana from the 
clerk's vault and delivered them/ to Chief Hannah (TT 283-285). 
Chief Hannah then delivered the three bags to Mr. Beck at the 
State Health Lab located in Salt Lake City (TT 291). In the 
presence of Chief Hannah, Mr. Beck removed a sample from each 
bag; he then analyzed each sample and concluded that the bags 
contained marijuana (TT 262-264). Following the analysis the 
bags were resealed and returned to Chief Hannah (TT 292). He 
then returned the bags to the Milford Police evidence locker 
where they remained until November 12, 1981 (TT 292). 
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On the second day of trial, respondent again 
proffered the three bags as evidence (TT 298). The respondent 
also proffered, as Exhibit Five, the sample removed by Officer 
Hutchison which was sent to the Health Lab by Sheriff 
Cartwright and later returned to Chief Hannah. Chief Hannah 
had placed the returned sample in the top drawer of his file 
cabinet where it remained until the second day of trial (TT 
229, 230, 288). Based upon the officers' testimony and the 
test results, Exhibits One, Two, Three and Four were received 
as evidence. 
Appellant contends that the marijuana seized 
pursuant to the warrant was admitted without proper 
foundation. Specifically, he argues that respondent failed to 
demonstrate a chain of possession that adequately links the 
marijuana plants seized on appellant's property to those 
plants actually admitted as evidence in court. 
In State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670, 
672 (1972), this Court held that before real evidence could be 
admitted "there must be a showing that the proposed exhibit is 
in substantially the same condition as at the time of the 
crime." The Madsen Court noted that chain of possession is 
one factor, inter alia, that is relevant in assessing whether 
real evidence has been altered. 498 P.2d at 672. See also: 
State v. Crook, 98 Idaho 383, 565 P.2d 576 (1977) (proof of 
chain of possession creates presumption that real evidence 
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is not materially altered). To admit the evidence, the trial 
court must only be convinced that in all reasonable 
probability the evidence is substantially unaltered. Crook, 
supra, 565 P.2d at 577. As a corollary, the party proffering 
the exhibit is not required to eliminate every conceivable 
possibility that the evidence was altered. Baughman v. State, 
582 S.W.2d 4 (Ark. 1979). See also: State v. Eagle Book, 
Inc., Utah, 578 P.2d 73 (1978) (the trial court must be 
satisfied that the proffered exhibit has not been altered, 
then the court may, within its discretion, admit the exhibit). 
Applying the aforementioned caselaw to the facts of 
the instant case, the trial court properly admitted as real 
evidence the marijuana plants seized on appellant's property. 
The trial transcript indicates that a clear chain of 
possession was established, and that the marijuana seized on 
appellant's property was the same marijuana introduced at his 
trial, without any material alteration. The three bags of 
marijuana were either in the possession of Chief Hannah, 
locked in the Beaver County Jail property room, in the 
possession of Mr. Beck, or locked in the court clerk's vault. 
There is absolutely no gap, no missing link, in the chain of 
possession of the marijuana from the time it was seized until 
the time it was proffered to the trial court. Furthermore, 
the officials responsible for the marijuana testified that the 
bags were properly marked for identification and always 
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sealed. Thus, respondent clearly established chain of 
possession, and, within all reasonable probability, 
established that no material alteration had occurred. 
Therefore, the trial court properly adrnitten the bags 
containing the seized marijuana. 
As an addendum, citing Utah Code Ann., § 77-23-8 
(1981) which states that an officer seizing contraband is 
responsible for its safekeeping, appellant contends that the 
chain of possession was broken when Chief Hannah turned the 
bags of marijuana over to Officer Hutchison, the property 
officer. He also argues that the foregoing statute was 
violated when samples taken from the bags were sent through 
the mail to the Health Lab. Thus, as construed by appellant, 
§ 77-23-8 apparently required that Chief Hannah personally 
maintain possession of the three bags twenty-four hours a day 
until the trial began. 
Appellant's construction is absurd, however. 
Certainly, § 77-23-8 was only intended to place ultimate 
responsibility on the seizing officer for the safekeeping of 
seized property. This does not mean that property officers 
and lab technicians should be denied temporary possession of 
seized property. The record here indicates that Chief Hannah 
acted responsibly in safeguarding the seized evidence, even 
though other officers temporarily possessed the three bags in 
discharging their duties. 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT 
APPELLANT'S TRIAL TO SUPPORT HIS 
CONVICTION. 
Appellant contends that although 119 marijuana 
plants were found on his property, respondent failed to prove 
that he was the one responsible for their growth and 
cultivation. He argues that the culprit could have been his 
wife or other members of his extended family who visited his 
home regularly. Thus, as he contends, the evidence was 
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
When faced with an insufficiency of evidence claim, 
this Court has accorded great deference to conclusions reached 
by the jury in matters solely within its province: 
It is the exclusive function of the jury 
to weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses, and it is 
not within the prerogative of this Court 
to substitute its judgment for that of the 
fact finder. This Court should only 
interfere when the evidence is so lacking 
and insubstantial that reasonable men 
could not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980). Furthermore, 
this Court has stated that its review of the evidence and 
those inferences reasonably deduced therefrom will be 
conducted in a light most favorable to the jury vernict. 
State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980). The 
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Kerekes court also stated that the burden lies with the 
defendant in demonstrating that the evidence was so 
inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt about his guilt. Id. at 1168. 
Actual physical possession of a controlled substance 
is not necessary for a conviction since possession may be 
inferred from other evidence: 
Unlawful possession does not necessarily 
mean that the substance be found on the 
person of the accused or that he have sole 
and exclusive possession thereof. All 
that is necessary is that the accused have 
constructive possession, where the 
contraband is subject to his dominion and 
control. 
State v. Carlson, Utah, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (1981). See also: 
State v. Ellis, 207 S.E.2d 408, 413 (S.C. 1974). 
In State v. Villavicencio, 108 Ariz. 518, 502 P.2d 
1337 (1972), the defendant was convicted of possession of 
heroin and marijuana. The narcotics had been found on a porch 
next to the back wall of the defendant's apartment, a location 
readily accessible to other tenants. On appeal, the defendant 
contended, inter alia, that respondent failed to prove 
possession. Although noting that the location in which the 
drugs were found was accessible to others, the Arizona Supreme 
Court held that because of their location the drugs were under 
the dominion and control of the defendant and thus 
constructively possessed by him. 502 P.2d at 1339. 
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In Landers v. State, 114 Ga. App. 687, 152 S.E.2d 
431 (1966), the defendant appealed his narcotics conviction 
contending, inter alia, that he co.uld not be deemed 
constructively in possession of narcotics when his wife held 
title to the home in which the contraband was found. 
Rejecting this contention and affirming his conviction, the 
Georgia Court of Appeals held: 
Therefore, if legal title to the real 
estate was in the wife, the defendant was 
the head of the household and possession 
of the narcotics was presumed to be his. 
152 S.E.2d at 432. 
Here, as in Villavicencio and Landers, supra, the 
jury could reasonably infer that appellant constructively 
possessed the marijuana plants because he exercised, by virtue 
of ownership, control and dominion over the property on which 
the plants were found. Furthermore, this inference is not 
rendered unreasonable merely because his friends, relatives, 
and wife had access to the property. Therefore, appellant has 
failed to show that the evidence was so inconclusive or 
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt about his guilt. Thus, his conviction was 
supported by sufficient evidence. 
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POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PLACED IN DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY. 
Appellant's trial began on November 9, 1981. .J\t 
6:40 p.m. that evening, the trial court granted respondent's 
motion for a continuance primarily because of the late hour, 
but also because of the trial court's refusal to admit certain 
real evinence (TT 224). Appellant's trial was reconvened on 
November 12, 1980, and concluded that morning. Appellant 
claims that this continuance placed him in double jeopardy. 
A claim of double jeopardy presupposes that jeopardy 
has first attached. Jeopardy attaches when a "trial 
terminates after the trier of fact resolved, or may have 
resolved, the factual issues determinative of criminal 
liability favorably to the defendant •••• " United States v. 
Sanabria, 548 F.2d 1, 6 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). 
In State ex rel. Fallis v. Vestrem, 527 P.2d 195 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1974), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals addressed an issue virtually identical to the issue 
raised by appellant here. There, following the presentation 
of testimony, a dispute arose over the chain of possession of 
the evidence. The State requested a continuance to obtain 
additional witnesses and the defendant objected. Following 
the trial court's grant of the continuance, the defendant 
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filed a motion requesting the court to reconsider the 
continuance. The trial court dismissed the case but stayed 
execution of the dismissal pending appellate review. The 
State appealed contending that the lower court erred when it 
dismissed the case on the basis of former jeopardy. The court 
of criminal appeals held: 
It is this Court's opinion a continuance 
of this matter is not analogous to a 
mistrial and does not raise an issue of 
double jeopardy. 
Id. at 197. 
Similarly, in the instant case, there is no merit to 
appellant's claim that the continuance placed him twice in 
jeopardy. 
POINT VI 
THE SEARCH WARRANT SECURED BY CHIEF 
HANNAH, A DE FACTO POLICE OFFICER, IS NOT 
VOID. 
On October 7, 1980, the date appellant's property 
was searched and his marijuana seized, Chief Hannah had failed 
to certify as a peace officer within eighteen months of his 
original appointment as prescribed by Ut~ Code Ann., § 67-15-
7 (1953), as amended. Based upon this failure to certify, 
appellant contends that Chief Hannah was without authority to 
execute a search warrant. 
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Although an officer may not be qualified by law, he 
is cloaked with de facto authority when he has possession of 
an office and discharges his outies under color of right. 
Thompson v. Clatskanie Peoples P.U.D., 35 Or. App. 843, 583 
P.2d 26, 28 (1978). Accord: Thibodeaux v. Comeaux, 243 La. 
468, 145 So.2d 1, 8 (1962). Furthermore, a de facto officer 
is one who is recognized and accepted as the rightful holder 
of the office by those who deal with him: State v. Miller, 
222 Kan. 405, 565 P.2d 228, 235 (1977); and the official acts 
of a de facto officer should be given the same effect as those 
of a de jure officer. State Dental Council and Examining 
Board v. Pollock, 318 A.2d 910 (Pa. 1974). 
In the case at bar, Chief Hannah had uncontested 
possession of the office of Chief of Police of Milford City. 
Furthermore, he discharged his duties as an officer under 
color of right. Additionally, other police officers and 
public officials, including Justice of the Peace H. c. Cook, 
/ 
who issued the search warrant, recognized and accepted Chief 
Hannah as the rightful holder of his office. Therefore, Chief 
Hannah, although not a de jure officer, was nonetheless 
clothed with de facto authority and his acts and conduct 
should be given the same effect. Thus, the search warrant was 
not void for want of proper authority in its execution. 
In State v. Franks, 7 wash. App. 594, 501 P.2d 622 
(1972), the Washington Court of Appeals addressed an issue 
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virtually identical to the one raised by appellant here. In 
Franks, the defendant appealed his drug possession conviction 
contending that a search warrant was invalid because it was 
not issued by a qualified judge. The facts revealed that the 
judge was not in full compliance with the statutory conditions 
required for his appointment. Affirming the defendant's 
conviction, the court of appeals held that the judge was 
indeed a de facto officer and was qualified to issue the 
contested search warrant. 501 P.2d at 623. 
Here, as in Franks, supra, Chief Hannah was a de 
facto officer and was properly qualified to execute the search 
warrant which led to the seizure of appellant's marijuana. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED NEITHER A SPEEDY 
TRIAL NOR TIMELY REPRESENTATION BY 
COUNSEL. 
Following his arrest, appellant was arraigned before 
Justice of the Peace H. C. Cook on October 24, 1980 (ST 29). 
During this hearing, Leo Kanell, a public defender, was 
appointed as counsel for appellant (ST 30). During the 
preliminary hearing on November 13, 1980, appellant asked Mr. 
Kanell to resign as his counsel because of alleged conflict of 
interest (ST 36). Appellant also indicated that he would earn 
enough income over Christmas to proviae his own counsel. The 
hearing was then reset for December 12, 1980 (ST 38). 
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The appellant failed to appear at the December 12, 
1980 hearing and it was reset for some time in January, 1981 
(ST 38) (exact date not specified in the record). At this 
hearing appellant requested another public defender and Mr. 
Cook informed him that Beaver County retained only one public 
defender--Leo Kanell (ST 38). Because Mr. Cook was not 
authorized to provide another public defender, appellant 
agreed to a transmittal of his case to the Circuit Court, with 
a hearing scheduled for February 11, 1981 (ST 40). 
On February 26, 1981, during an appearance by 
appellant before Circuit Court Judge Ronnow, Mr. Scott Thorley 
was appointed his counsel (ST 64). Mr. Thorley resigned April 
10, 1981 due to differences of opinion with appellant (ST 64). 
Mr. Dexter Anderson was then appointed appellant's counsel on 
April 15, 1981. Appellant contends that these delays denied 
him both a speedy trial and timely representation by counsel 
in violation of Utah Code Ann.,§§ 77-32-1 and 77-35-7(4)(c) 
(1953), as amended. 
The facts in the record clearly indicate that both 
claims lack merit. Utah Code Ann.,§ 77-35-7(4)(c) (1953), as 
amended, provides in relevant part: 
[The preliminary] examination shall be 
held within a reasonable time, but in any 
event not later than ten days if the 
defendant is in custody for the defense 
charged and not later than 30 days if he 
is not in custody; provided however that 
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these time periods may be extended by the 
magistrate for good cause shown. 
(emphasis added). Each extension granted by the magistrate 
was the result of appellant's failure to attend a hearing, 
inability to provide his own counsel or inability to work with 
appointed counsel. In each case the magistrate was justified 
in ordering a time extension for appellant's preliminary 
hearing. 
Furthermore, appellant's speedy trial claim lacks 
merit because the delays were caused by his conduct. State v. 
Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115 (1982); State v. Dolack, 216 
Kan. 622, 533 P.2d 1282 (1975). In addition, appellant has 
failed to show that the delays in his preliminary hearing 
prejudiced him. State v. Freeman, 599 P.2d 368 (Mont. 1979). 
In sum, appellant was not denied his right to a 
speedy trial, and the magistrate was justified in grainting 
time extensions for his preliminary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction was sufficiently supported by 
evidence properly seized under a valid search warrant executed 
by a peace officer possessing the requisite authority. 
Furthermore, appellant was not denied either a speedy trial or 
timely representation of counsel. Therefore, respondent 
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respectfully requests this Court affirm appellant's 
conviction. 
DATED this 24th day of August, 1982. 
ROBERT N. 
Assistant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
General 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Dexter L. 
Anderson, Attorney for Appellant, P.O. Box 566, 61 South Main, 
Fillmore, Utah, 84631, this 24th day of August, 1982. 
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